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Abstract
We develop a model to study market interaction between rational
firms on one side of the market and boundedly rational consumers on
the other. A special feature of bounded rationality is modelled here:
from psychological evidence, people tend to group events or numbers
into categories; therefore we consider consumers who partition the
price space into connected sets and regard each price belonging to the
same set as equal.
According to Rubinstein (1993), we endogenize the choice of the
price partition by consumers, who determine the optimal price parti-
tion given the constraint imposed on their ability to process informa-
tion on prices. We develop a model with two firms and two states of
nature. We show that we depart from classical Bertrand result when
consumers are characterized by a bound on the finiteness of price par-
tition inferior to the cardinality of the space of world states. In other
words, in presence of consumers who can partition the price space into
two sets and with two states of the world, firms find optimal to set
price above marginal cost, making positive profits. The intuition of
the result can be explained as follows: when a consumer chooses the
price partition, she faces a trade oﬀ between the detection of the state
of nature and the detection of a deviating behavior of the firm in a
given state of nature.
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1 Introduction
In economic models decision makers are assumed to be fully rational, in the
sense that economic agents are not limited in their ability to process infor-
mation or perform calculations. In most of the models of economic theory
behavioral diﬀerences among consumers are due to diﬀerences in preferences
or in the information they possess. Wide psychological evidence indicates
instead that human beings depart systematically from full rationality: cog-
nitive limitations aﬀect individual ability to recognize prices and therefore
to process the information contained in price oﬀers. We aim at investigating
the role of bounded rationality into industrial organization framework and
studying how bounded rationality aﬀects market performances of firms and
determines departures from well-established results.
This paper studies market interaction between rational firms on one side
of the market and boundedly rational consumers on the other. While firms
are assumed to be standard profit-maximizer competing a la Bertrand, con-
sumers are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they process infor-
mation on prices. On one hand, the presence of bounded rationality makes
consumers vulnerable to exploitation by rational firms; on the other hand,
the competition among firms reduces the incentive to take advantage of con-
sumers in order to beat the competitors and gain market share. This paper
aims at investigating the interplay of these two opposite forces.
We develop a stilized model, where we characterize explicitly the proce-
dural element of bounded rationality in the decisional procedure. The paper
is motivated by psychological evidence on consumer information process-
ing: studies of Rosch and Mervis (1975) enlights the existence of a common
heuristic: in environments with abundance of information, people exhibit
the tendency of grouping events, objects or numbers into categories on the
basis of perceived similarities. We attempt at incorporating this heuristic
by modelling explicitly the choice of the price partition made by consumers.
In particular, we develop a partitional model on the price space and con-
sumers are assumed to be bounded in their ability to process information
over prices. As in Rubinstein (1993), this translates into the assumption
that exists a bound on the finiteness of price space partition, i.e. on the
number of sets into which the price space can be divided by consumers. The
agent chooses her optimal information structure, i.e. the optimal price par-
tition, given a constraint on her ability to process information. We depart
from Rubinstein setting by modelling the price competition among perfectly
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rational firms. While Rubinstein examines the optimal pricing schedule of a
monopolist who discriminates among consumers, here we study the optimal
pricing choice of firms competing a la Bertrand. The main novelty of the
paper consists in addressing directly the question on the role of a procedu-
ral element of boundedly rationality on the competitive mechanism and the
eﬀects on the equilibrium configuration.
In the first part of the paper, we develop a very simple model, where
we investigate this issue under the assumption that the price partition of
each consumer is exogenously given. Despite this simplifying assumption,
firms’ behavior departs systematically from standard Bertrand result: the
equilibrium price never collapses to marginal cost, so that the competitive
incentive to undercut the rival does not outweight completely the incentive to
exploit the bounded rationality feature displayed by consumers. The result is
robust both to the introduction of heterogeneity on firm’s cost structure and
on consumers’ side, modelled in terms of diﬀerences in the price partition.
In the second part, we endogenize the choice of the price partition by
consumers, who determine the optimal price partition given the constraint
imposed on their ability to process information on prices. We develop a model
with two firms and two states of nature. We show that under certain values
of the parameters, we depart from classical Bertrand result when consumers
are characterized by a bound on the finiteness of price partition inferior to
the cardinality of the space of world states. In other words, in presence of
consumers who can partition the price space into two sets and with two states
of the world, firms find optimal to set price above marginal cost, making
positive profits. The intuition of the result can be explained as follows:
when a consumer chooses the price partition, she faces a trade oﬀ between
the detection of the state of nature and the detection of a deviation of the
firm in a given state of nature.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the related
literature. In section 3 we present the model under the assumption of a
price partition assigned exogenously to each consumers. The choice of price
partition is endogenised in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
The present paper is closely related with the literature on bounded ratio-
nality. The paper takes as a departure point Rubinstein (1993), where he
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models the endogenous choice of a price partition by an agent character-
ized by a bound on his ability to process information on prices and exam-
ines the price chosen by a monopolistic firm which cannot discriminate price
among consumers on the market of an indivisible good. The model is par-
ticularly interesting because of two characteristics: it constitues one of the
few and earliest attempt to incorporate elements of bounded rationality into
the field of industrial organization. Secondly, it provides a modelling tool
for bounded rationality, according to which the agents are bounded on the
ability to process information on the endogenous price set by the monopolist
in equilibrium. While diﬀerences in information are modelled by diﬀerences
in partitions of the relevant state space, here diﬀerences in the ability to pro-
cess information are modelled as diﬀerences in the constraints on the family
of partitions available to the consumers.
Dow (1991) characterizes the choice of a price partition in a two stage
game, where the consumer visits two stores following a fixed order and with-
out the possibility of stopping his search. The consumer cannot exactly
remember the price quoted at the first store, but only remembers to which
partition the quoted price belongs. The main diﬀerence with respect to Ru-
binstein (1993) relies on the fact that the decision problem of the agent is not
embedded into an equilibrium analysis, but the price is exogenously drawn
from a random probability distribution, exogenously given and identical for
both firms.
Other papers attempt at integrating elements of bounded rationality into
industrial organization framework. Spiegler (2003), (2004) study compe-
tition among rational firms over boundedly rational consumers, where the
element of bounded rationality captures a cognitive limitation in they way
agents process information in stochastic environments. A particular kind
of limited rationality is taken into account: the consumers choose accord-
ing to the S (K) procedure modelled by Osborne and Rubinstein (1998), i.e.
they sample every alternative K times and choose the best alternative in the
sample. This procedure can be interpreted in the light of the ”representa-
tiveness” heuristic, (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which captures people’s
attitude to use limited experience to form assessments, neglecting base rates
and sample size. Spiegler (2003) considers a market for a treatment, where
a continuum of patients recover with a given exogenous probability whether
or not they acquire a quack’s treatment. Spiegler shows that a market for
quacks arises when agents make incorrect inference according to the S (K)
procedure and quacks end up charging positive prices and inflicting a welfare
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loss on consumers. Spiegler (2004) studies a market consisting of n profit-
maximising firms and a continuum of agents, where each firm oﬀers lotteries
over divisions of the firm-agent interaction of a unit surplus. Analitically
each firm chooses a cumulative distribution function over the unit interval.
A consumer chooses the best lottery in his sample formed with an S (1) pro-
cedure. The main result is that a higher number of competitors increases
only the noisiness of the distribution without changing the expected value
of the lottery to the consumers. This implies that standard intuition on
competition fails to apply here.
Other papers have studied the interaction between rational and bound-
edly rational agents. Piccione and Rubinstein (2004) model diﬀerences among
agents in their ability to recognise temporal patterns of prices: they use
the concept of De Brunijin sequences in a dynamic model of markets to
demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which prices fluctuate over time
independently of the fundamentals and only competent agents can recognise
the price patterns. Fershtam and Kalai (1993) study competitive behavior
of firms which operate in multiple markets and whose ability to implement
complex competition strategies in these market is bounded; this is the only
model that incorporates elements of bounded rationality on firm’s side.
Another literature strand to which the paper refers is the field of behav-
ioral economics: Laibson and Gabaix (2004) study the eﬀect of imperfect
consumer knowledge on the pricing schedule oﬀered by a firm on the mar-
ket of a single good. They define consumer’s knowledge to be imperfect as
the situation where consumers are not able to anticipate ”shrouded” prod-
uct attributes or consumers have noisy evaluations of product attributes.
This ”ad hoc” assumption constitues a critical point since the deviation
from standard competition results rely entirely on an exogenous element
describing consumer’s limitation to process information. Della Vigna and
Malmendier (2004) study contract design in the face of consumers who have
time-inconsistent preferences and are only partially aware of that and develop
an application to health club industry.
Relevant is the literature on equilibrium in markets with search. Within
the search literature, Salop (1977) tries at explaining price dispersion in a
market where consumer know the prices available but do not know what
stores charges what price. Each consumer can either choose to buy a unity
good from a store randomly chosen or to incur a fixed search cost in order
to get informed about which stores charge the lowest price. This literature
is related because the search cost can be reinterpreted as the mental cost
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of processing information, instead of the physical cost of sampling. Under
the assumption of a correlation between consumers’ search costs and other
consumers’ characteristics, Salop shows that a monopolist finds optimal to
charge diﬀerent prices.
3 A toy model: the case of exogenous price
partition
This section is devoted to the analysis of a simple model where we show
that introducing an element of bounded rationality changes completely the
result of standard models. Here we consider the eﬀect of an element of
bounded rationality displayed by consumers on the equilibrium configura-
tion of Bertrand model of competition among rational firms. The literature
on consumer information processing suggests that observed price information
is encoded, evaluated, integrated into memory and finally recalled, and all
these processes exhibit potential inaccuracies. Studies of Rosch and Mervis
(1975) enlights the existence of a common heuristic: in environments with
abundance of information, people exhibit the tendency of grouping events,
objects or numbers into categories on the basis of perceived similarities. Fol-
lowing Simon (1982), we model explicitly a procedural aspects of decision
making, consisting in the choice of the price partition and we introduce a
specific element of bounded rationality, in terms of a limitation of the set of
possible price partitions available to consumers. Here we start with a sim-
plified framework where the price partition is exogenously assigned to each
consumer and that will be extended in the next section.
We consider the market for a single good, consisting of two sellers and
N consumers, each of whom is interested in consuming only one unity of
the good. Two identical firms compete a la Bertrand, oﬀering the same
homogenous good and have the same marginal cost, c.
Here, we introduce the key element of the model: while firms are assumed
to be perfectly rational, the consumers are boundedly rational, in the sense
they are limited in their ability to process information given in a price oﬀer
made in the market. As in Rubinstein (1993), the bounded rationality of
consumers is modelled in terms of a bound on the family of partitions of
prices recognized by the agent: the agent can only recognize whether the price
belongs to a certain interval, but does not remember the exact price of the
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good. We constrain the information structure to be a partition of the price
set consisting of connected intervals. Agents are assumed to be homogenous,
in the sense that they are characterized by the same price partition and
the same number of sets in the partition (i.e. the number of cutting points
+1). In this section we consider the simplest price partition, with only one
cutting point, labelled with x. In other words, agents are characterized by
the following decision rule: buy if and only if p ≤ x, i.e. buy only if the
price is lower or equal than an (exogenously given) price threshold x1. We
are assuming that consumers have an exogenously fixed price partition, and
in particular that they partition the price space only into two regions. This
partition can be interpreted as the division of the price space into two regions
corresponding to the high and low price regions, such that the consumer finds
convenient to buy the good only if the price is regarded to be low, i.e. if the
price is lower than the threshold x. Otherwise, the consumer is not willing
to buy the commodity if she believes the price to be high, since it is above
the threshold.
We characterise the equilibrium price chosen by firms who compete a la
Bertrand.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium is set at p1 = p2 = x ≥ c
Proof. See Appendix
In this very simple model, at equilibrium both firms set a price higher than
the marginal cost and make positive profits at equilibrium. Here, standard
intuition on competition fails to apply and the equilibrium price configuration
deviates systematically from standard Bertrand result where firms have a
symmetric cost structure. This departure standard result is motivated by
the presence of a cognitive limitation on consumer’s side: because agents
cannot recognize prices below the exogenous cutting point x in the partition,
firms do not have any incentive to undercut prices below x. The bounded
perception of prices by the consumers introduces a countervailing incentive
with respect to standard Bertrand model: on one side, firms display an
incentive to undercut in order to gain market share; on the other side firms
have an incentive to increase prices below the cutting point up to x, since
this increase of the price does not have any eﬀect on sales share, but will
only have a positive eﬀect on profit margin per unit sold. The interplay of
1Note that the only interesting case is when x ≥ c.
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these two opposed incentives drives the equilibrium result. Obviously, when
x = c, we simply collapse to the standard Bertrand case.
Analogous result is obtained when we introduce an asymmetry in the cost
structure on firm’s side. Suppose without loss of generality that firm 1 has
a constant marginal cost c1 < c2, under the assumption c1 < c2 ≤ x2. The
following Proposition establishes the market equilibrium configuration.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium is set at p1 = p2 = x ≥ c2 > c1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Both firms make positive profits at equilibrium, even though firm 1 is
making more profits than firm 2. Again, and even more clearly, we move
away from Bertrand classical result: at equilibrium both firms are active on
the market, even the one with the largest marginal cost and both charge price
strictly above marginal costs and equal to the cutting point x. Firms face the
same trade-oﬀ between the incentive to undercut rival’s price and to increase
price up to the threshold. The equilibrium configuration in Proposition 2
is the result of the fact that the latter incentive outweighs the former one.
The interplay of these two forces drives the result according to which the
ineﬃcient firm has positive market share at equilibrium. Results are robust
to the introduction of heterogeneity on consumers’ side3.
4 Endogenizing the Choice of Price Partition
In this section we endogenise the choice of price partition made by consumers
and we study the issue of whether firms can still take advantage of this
element of bounded rationality despite competition forces.The crucial feature
of the model relies on the fact that the agents are bounded on the ability to
process information on endogenous equilibrium prices
The main idea of the paper is to model explicitly the tradeoﬀ between
the detection of a state of nature and the deviation of firm in a given state
of nature. The consumer chooses the optimal price partition on equilibrium
prices: when choosing the cutoﬀ the consumer can try to detect the state of
2This is again the only non trivial case. In fact, under a diﬀerent assumption on
relevant economic parameters, c1 < x ≤ c2, the firm with lowest marginal cost would have
an incentive to undercut the rival, excluding her from the market and having positive
profits charging a price equal to x ≤ p = c2 − ε
3See proof in Appendix 2 .
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nature realized or to fix the cutoﬀ in order to detect anticompetitive deviation
of the firm.
The idea I have in mind can be explained through a very simple example.
Every day I go to work and I do my shopping on the way to work or back
home. I can reach work just following two diﬀerent routes. A supermarket
is located on each route. Therefore the consumer can visit just a single store
on each route. I can go to the supermarket when there a lot persons decide
to do their shopping or, at the contrary, during times of the day when fewer
persons do shopping.
I can interpret the state of world "the supermarket is crowded" or " the
supermarket is not crowded", and this what I label high state or low state
of world.
We depart from Rubinstein (JPE, 1993) by considering two firms compet-
ing for the market of the good a la Bertrand. Firms choose their prices both
simultaneously and non cooperatively. We consider a market for a single
good, consisting of two sellers and N consumers, each of whom is interested
in consuming only one unity of the good.
Two states of nature, labelled H and L, may occur. Consumers and firms
have the same initial belief that the probabilities of state H and L are πH
and πL. Once nature selects, only the firms get informed about which state
of nature is realized. Firms have a symmetric cost structure: the costant
marginal cost of producing in H state is cH and in L state is cL, set equal
to zero with no loss of generality. Consumers’ evaluation of one unity of the
commodity is equal to vH in H state and vL in L state. It is assumed that
vH > vL. Here, it is assumed that all consumers are able to determine only
one cutting point: they can divide the price space in two connected sets and
are able to attach the order ”buy” or ”not buy” to each of the two sets.
Therefore the consumers can decide ”always buy”,”never buy”,”buy if and
only if p ≤ p∗”,”buy iﬀ p ≥ p∗”,”buy iﬀ p < p∗” and ”buy iﬀ p > p∗”
The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1: Each firm announces its pricing policy. Firms announce their
pricing policy simultaneously.
Stage 2: Each consumer selects a partition (given the constraint on con-
sumer’s type) for each firm.
Stage 3: Nature selects.
Stage 4: Each consumer gets information about the cell in his partition
which includes announced price and decide whether or not to purchase the
good and decides to buy from the firm characterized by the lower index.
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Each firm commits itself to the pricing policy announced in stage 1 of the
game and the firm’s oﬀer is determined determined by the pricing policy to
which the seller has committed itself, after uncertainty is solved in stage 3.
The following Proposition characterises the equilibrium configuration in
pure strategy where each firm selects a price for each state of the world.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage of the game,
firms compete in prices and deliver binding pricing oﬀers to a representative
consumer.
The consumer processes the information contained in the pricing oﬀers
submitted by firms and chooses the price partition in order to minimize her
expected cost to buy the good, given the cutoﬀ rule.Nature chooses the state
of the world and each firm is obliged to deliver the good at the announced
price. Consumer buys the good according to the cutoﬀ rule chosen in stage
2.
Assumptions on parameters: vH ≥ cH > vL ≥ cL.
Lemma 1 Given a price configuration such that λ∗ = eλ and the consumer
finds optimal to buy in both states of world, each firm has no incentive to
undercut the rival firm in state L in such a way that the consumer will still
find optimal to choose the same cutoﬀ, i.e. λ∗ = eλ
Proof. Trivial. The deviating firm lowers the profit margin per unit without
increasing market share.
Lemma 2 Given a price configuration such that λ∗ = cH and the consumer
finds optimal to buy in both states of world, each firm has no incentive to
undercut the rival firm in state H in such a way that pjL < p0iH < cH
Proof. Obvious. The deviating firm would sustain a loss for sure in state
H, without increasing market share in state L.
The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the model.
Proposition 3 For parameters values vH − cH ≥ vL − cL and cH < πLvL +
πHvH, the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is a symmetric configura-
tion where firms charge prices equal to piH = cH and piL = vL and the
representative consumer chooses a cutoﬀ equal to cH. For parameters values
vH − cH ≥ vL − cL and cH ≥ πLvL + πHvH, the unique Nash equilibrium
of the game is a symmetric configuration where firms charge prices equal to
piH = cH and piL = vL +
πH
πL
(vH − cH) and the representative consumer
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chooses a cutoﬀ equal to cH .For parameters values vH − cH < vL − cL , the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game is a symmetric configuration where firms
charge prices equal to piH = cH and piL = cL and the representative consumer
chooses a cutoﬀ equal to cH .
Proof. See Appendix.
When the profit margin per unit in high state is lower than the one in
the low state, the Nash Equilibrium coincides with the one established in
standard Bertrand model: each firm set a price equal to the marginal cost
in each state of the world, i.e. piH = cH and piL = vL for each firm i = 1, 2.
However, when the unit profit margin is higher in state H than in state L,
the Nash equilibrium departs systematically from Bertrand result. In the
case the cost in state H is low enogh, each firm will realize profits in the low
state, by setting the price in the low state equal to the monopolistic one, i.e.
piL = vL. In the opposite case, each firm is able to realise half of the cartel
profits: each firm can take advantage of consumers by setting a price equal
to cH in state H, but a price higher than vL in state L, in such a way that the
firm can get half profits she would get as she prices at consumer’s evaluation
in each state of nature4.
These results are coherent with empirical evidence regarding profit mar-
gins on retail and wholesale prices for large supermarkets chains, as pointed
out in Chevalier et all (2005): they find that prices fall on average during sea-
sonal demand peaks for a product, largely due to changes in retail margins.
Retail margins for a specific good are showed to fall during peak demand
periods for that good, even if these periods do not coincide with aggregate
demand peaks for the retailer.
4Note that the Nash equilibrium is unique for each parameter interval.
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5 Conclusions
We have developed a model in order to study market interaction between
rational firms on one side of the market and boundedly rational consumers
on the other. We consider a special feature of bounded rationality: from psy-
chological evidence, people tend to group events or numbers into categories,
so here we consider consumers who partition the price space into connected
sets and regard each price belonging to the same set as equal. In presence
of this feature of bounded rationality, we expect that on one hand, the pres-
ence of bounded rationality makes consumers vulnerable to exploitation by
rational firms; on the other hand, the competition among firms reduces the
incentive to take advantage of consumers in order to beat the competitors
and gain market share. This paper shows that we depart systematically from
standard Bertrand result, i.e. even in presence of a symmetric cost structure
profits do not collapse to zero and prices charged by firms are well above the
marginal cost
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix 1: Detailed proofs
Proof. of Proposition 1 Consider the following two cases: p1 > p2 > x > c
or p1 = p2 > x > c.
No firm has a positive demand and its profit is zero. On the other hand,
if firm 1 charges p1 = x− ε, it obtains the entire market, with profits equal
to N (x− ε− c) and has a positive profit margin of x−ε−c. Therefore, firm
1 does not charge the optimal price.
Consider p1 > x > p2 > c. Firm 1 has zero market share and zero profit.
By reducing its price slightly to x − ε, firm 1 gains half of the market and
earns positive profits 1
2
N (x− ε− c) . Firm 1 does not need to reduce its
price below p2, given that consumers cannot recognize the diﬀerence between
x and any price inferior to x belonging to the partition associated with the
order to buy.
Consider x > p1 = p2 = c. Firm 1 can increase its profit by charging the
price c+ ε, since it earns positive profits, without losing market share.
The only equilibrium configuration is represented by p1 = p2 = x > c,
associated with positive profits of both firms.
Proof. of Proposition 2 As above. Note only that firm 1 will never find
optimal to cut price below c2, since it would not increase market share, given
the price partition of the consumers, but the decrease of the price has only
the eﬀect to lower its profit margin, without increasing market share.
Proof. of Proposition 3 5 The objective function of the consumer is
max
{λ,γs}
X
s=H,L
πs (vs − pis) γs
where πs is the exogenous probability that state of nature s occurs, vs is
consumer’s evaluation of the good in state of nature s and γs
6 is an indicator
variable defined as:
γs =
½
0 if NOT BUY in state s
1 if BUY in state s
5In the proof we make use of two simplifying observations when we calculate equilibrium
cutoﬀ: piL ≤ piH for every i and the equilibrium price vector is symmetric, i.e. firms charge
the same price in the same state of world.
6Note that γs and λ depends on optimal price vector at equilibrium, i.e.
λ = f (p1L, p1H , p2L, p2H)
γs = f (p1L, p1H , p2L, p2H ;λ)
14
With no loss of generality, assume πH ≥ πL
Case 1
pis ≤ vs ∀s, i
The optimal cutoﬀ is
λ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
max
s=H,L
h
min
i
pis
i
if πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ πL
2
∆L
min
i
piL otherwise
γs =
(
1,∀s if πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ πL
2
∆L
1 for s = L, 0 for s = H otherwise
where ∆L = pL − pL and ps = maxi pis,ps = mini pis,for s = L,H. The
consumer chooses the cutoﬀ λ that maximises consumer’s expected utility.
Given the cutoﬀ rule the consumer can either choose to buy the good in each
state of the world or only in state L; note that the consumer cannot decide
to buy only in state H due to cutoﬀ rule7. Under the first cutoﬀ value, the
consumer rules out the highest price in the price set and she receives:
EU =
πL
2
³
vL − pL
´
+
πL
2
(vL − pL) + πH
³
vH − pH
´
while under the second cutoﬀ configuration the consumer rules out to buy in
high state and the best she can do is to buy at cheapest price in low state,
with an expected utility of:
EU = πL
³
vL − pL
´
The consumer will choose the cutoﬀ that maximises her expected utility.
Proposition 4 Proof.
7Note that the consumer cannot exclude with certainty to buy from firm charging price
pis associated with minimal net utility min
i,s
(vs − pis) Given the cutoﬀ rule, she can only
exclude to buy the good in state of nature H if piH > piL ∀i, given the assumption
cH > cL.
15
Case 2
piH > vH , pjH ≤ vH for i 6= j, piL ≤ vL ∀i
The optimal cutoﬀ is
λ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
max
s=H,L
h
min
i
pis
i
if πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ πL
2
∆L
min
i
piL otherwise
γs =
(
1,∀s if πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ πL
2
∆L
1 for s = L, 0 for s = H otherwise
As before.
Case 3
piH ≤ vH ∀i, piL > vL, pjL ≤ vL for i 6= j
The optimal cutoﬀ is
λ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
max
s=H,L
h
min
i
pis
i
, if πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ πL
2
∆L
min
i
(piL) otherwise
with
γs =
(
1,∀s if πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ πL
2
∆L
1 for s = L, 0 for s = H otherwise
and expected utility equal to
EU =
πL
2
³
vL − pL
´
+
πL
2
(vL − pL) + πH
³
vH − pH
´
in the first case and
EU = πL
³
vL − pL
´
in the second case.
Case 4
piH > vH ∀i, piL ≤ vL ∀i
The optimal cutoﬀ is
λ = min
i
(piL)
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γs =
½
1, s = L
0, s = H
The consumer finds profitable to buy only in low state since she can rule out
the state of world with negative net utility in state H and attaining the highest
expected utility, given the price vector, equal to:
EU = πL
³
vL − pL
´
Case 5
piH > vH , pjH ≤ vH for i 6= j, piL > vL, pjL ≤ vL for i 6= j
The optimal cutoﬀ is
λ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
max
s
h
min
i
pis
i
, if πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ πL
2
∆L
min
i
(piL) otherwise
with
γs =
(
1,∀s if πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ πL
2
∆L
1 for s = L, 0 for s = H otherwise
and expected utility equal to
EU =
πL
2
³
vL − pL
´
+
πL
2
(vL − pL) + πH
³
vH − pH
´
in the first case and
EU = πL
³
vL − pL
´
in the second case. The condition follows straight from the comparison of
the two expected utility; the consumer chooses the cutoﬀ that maximises her
expected utility.
Case 6
piL > vL ∀i, piH ≤ vH ∀i
The optimal cutoﬀ rule is:
λ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
max
s
h
min
i
pis
i
, if
πL
2
h³
vL − pL) + (vL − pL
´i
+ πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ 0
max
i,s
(pis) + ε otherwise
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γs =
(
1 ∀s if πL
2
h³
vL − pL) + (vL − pL
´i
+ πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ 0
0 ∀s otherwise
in the first case and γs =in the second case.
Case 7
piL > vL, pjL ≤ vL for i 6= j, piH > vH ∀i
The optimal cutoﬀ is:
λ = min
i
piL
γL = 1, γH = 0
with expected utility equal to
EU = πL
³
vL − pL
´
Case 8
piL > vL ∀i, piH > vH , pjH ≤ vH for i 6= j
The optimal cutoﬀ is
λ =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
max
s=H,L
h
min
i
pis
i
, if
πL
2
X
i
(vL − piL) + πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ 0
max
i,s
(pis) + , otherwise
with
γs =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1,∀s if πL
2
X
i
(vL − piL) + πH
³
vH − pH
´
≥ 0
0 ∀s otherwise
expected utility equal to
EU =
πL
2
³
vL − pL
´
+
πL
2
(vL − pL) + πH
³
vH − pH
´
in the first case and
EU = πL
³
vL − pL
´
in the second case. The condition follows immediately from the comparison
of the two expected utility.
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Case 9
piL > vL ∀i, piH > vH ∀i
The optimal cutoﬀ is:
λ = max
i,s
(pis) + ε
γs = 0 ∀s
with expected utility equal to EU = 0. The consumer is better oﬀ by choosing
the outside option not to buy the good, since she gets a zero expected utility
instead of a negative one.
The second part of the proof characterizes the optimal behaviour of the
firm. In stage 1 firms compete in prices and set the price of the good in both
states of nature in order to maximise total expected profits. We analyse the
optimal behavior of the firm under each case.
Under Case 1, the monopolistic price configuration according to which the
monopolistic price, equal to consumer’s evaluation of the good, vs for s =
L,H is charged in both states of the world, cannot be an equilibrium. Un-
der the monopolistic price configuration, firm’ s expected profits is equal to
E (Πi) =
1
2
X
s=L,H
πs (vs − cs). Each firm has a unilateral incentive to deviate
in state H: each firm gains all the market in state H and increases profits
above (half) the monopolist level by slightly undercutting the rival and setting
a price p0iH = vH−ε with ε small enough in state H. Firms will find optimal
to undercut in state H, triggering out a price war in the high state of world.
This means that vH cannot be an equilibrium price. According to Lemma
1, given a price configuration, each firm has no incentive to deviate only in
state L and slightly undercut the rival in state L, since it would not induce a
change in the optimal cutoﬀ chosen by consumer; therefore he would simply
lose profit margin per unit without gaining market share.
A candidate Nash equilibrium is the price configuration
{p∗is}s=L,H i=1,2 = [p∗iL = vL; p∗iH = cH ]
corresponding to firms’ profits equal to
Eπ∗i =
πL
2
(vL − cL) i = 1, 2
and consumer’s cutoﬀ
λ∗ = cH
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Note that according to Lemma 1, firms do not have an incentive to slightly
undercut price in state L since they would only lose profit margin per unit,
without gaining market share and they cannot increase price in state H, since
they do not gain any market share.
We need to rule out three possible deviations for this price configuration to
be an equilibrium. First, each firm can undercut piL so low that consumer
finds profitable to deviate from cutoﬀ and buy only in state L. Suppose firm
i deviates and charges p0iL. Then, consumer chooses cutoﬀ to maximise ex-
pected utility: she will set the cutoﬀ at λ0 = p0iL if EU 0 = πL
¡
vL − p0iL
¢
>
EU∗ =
πL
2
¡
vL − p0iL
¢
+πH (vH − cH). The consumer chooses λ to maximise
her expected utility. To rule out this deviation, it is suﬃcient to assume
vH − cH ≥ vL − cL
The second deviation available to each firm goes in the opposite direction:
each firm can deviate unilaterally in state L and increase price above vL
without inducing a change in λ∗. Each firm has an incentive to deviate and
charge a price up to p0L = vL + πHπL (vH − cH) . This configuration cannot
be for sure an equilibrium if p0L ≥ cH, since the consumer can detect the
deviation and rule out to buy from the deviating firm in state L. This happens
when
cH ≥ πLvL + πHvH
By Lemma 2 we know that the firm has no incentive to undercut pH in state
H below cH, unless he deviates in both states simultaneously setting the same
price in state L and H. Suppose the firm i deviates and sets p0iH = p0iL =
vL−ε, with expected profits equal to Eπ0i = vL−ε− (πLcL + πHcH). To rule
out this deviation, Eπ0i < Eπ∗i , which requires in the limiting condition that
cH > vL +
πL
2πH
(vL − cL)
which is always satisfied for (vL − cL)→ 0 or cH very high.
In case
vH − cH ≥ vL − cL
cH ≤ πLvL + πHvH
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the equilibrium price configuration is
{p∗is}s=L,H; i=1,2 =
∙
p∗iL = vL +
πH
πL
(vH − cH) ; p∗iH = cH
¸
with expected profits
Eπ∗i =
πH
2
(vH − cH) +
πL
2
(vL − cL) , i = 1, 2
and consumer’s cutoﬀ
λ∗ = cH
If
cH ≤ vL +
πL
2πH
(vL − cL)
the equilibrium price configuration is
{p∗is}s=L,H; i=1,2 = [p∗iL = cL; p∗iH = cH ]
with expected profits
Eπ∗i = 0 i = 1, 2
and consumer’s cutoﬀ
λ∗ = cH
Under Case 2, firm i can profitably increase profits by setting piH equal
to rival’s level. So we are back to case 1.
Under Case 3, suppose the price vector is such that consumer chooses
as a cutoﬀ λ = min
i
(piL). The firm charging the highest piL does not sell
in any state of world and can increase profits by undercutting the rival in
state L or by decreasing piH so that the cutoﬀ chosen by consumers is λ =
max
s
h
min
i
(piL)
i
, in which case the consumer buys in both states of nature.
As in case 1. On the other side, firm charging lowest price in L state can
increase the price up to rival’s price without losing market share, but this
would collapse either to case 6
Under Case 4 each firm can profitably deviate by setting a price in state
H equal to vH and serve all the market in high state of nature (back to case
2
Under Case 5 the firm charging the highest price in state H can profitably
increase profits by undercutting the rival in state H (back to case 3)
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Under Case 6 suppose the price vector is such that the consumer never
finds optimal to buy. Each firm has a unilateral incentive to deviate to reduce
price either in L or in H state of nature. Suppose the firm deviates in state
L, we collapse to cases 3 or 1.
Under Case 7: as in case 5.
Under Case 8 suppose the price vector is such that the consumer never
finds optimal to buy. Each firm has a unilateral incentive to deviate to reduce
price either in L or in H state of nature. Suppose the price vector is such
that consumer finds optimal to buy in both states of nature. The firm with
highest price in state H finds profitable to deviate and undercut the rival in
state H, gaining all the market (and we collapse back to case 6).
Under Case 9, each firm is charging a price above consumer’s evaluation
and has a zero market share. Each firm can profitably deviate by setting a
price just equal to the monopolistic price and gain all the market. We collapse
in any of the previous cases.
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6.2 Appendix 2: The case of heterogenous consumers
We examine the eﬀect of introducing heterogeneity on consumer’s side within
the simple setting presented in the above section. Consumers are assumed
to be characterized by a diﬀerent (exogenous) partition of the price space.
Assume type i consumer acts according to the following decision rule:
buy if and only if p ≤ xi, i.e. buy only if the price is lower or equal than an
(exogenously given) price threshold xi. We assume there are only two types
of consumers, and one consumer for each type and without loss of generality
that x2 < x1.
We consider firms characterized by a symmetric cost structure: let us
assume the relevant economic parameters satisfy the following relation: c ≤
x2 < x1. The next Proposition characterises the equilibrium configuration.
Proposition 5 There is a unique equilibrium, given by: p1 = p2 = x2 if
x1 − x2 < (x2 − c), or p1 = p2 = x1 if x1 − x2 > 2 (x2 − c); there are
two equilibrium at p1 = x1 and p2 = x2 or at p1 = x2 and p2 = x1 if
(x2 − c) < x1 − x2 < 2 (x2 − c)
Proof. Consider the following case: p1 = p:2 = x1. Both firms sell one
unit of the good to type 1 consumer with equal probability, but nothing
to type 2 consumer, achieving a profit level equal to πi = 12 (x1 − c) for
i = 1, 2. Suppose firm 1 deviates by charging a price p1 = x2: by lowering
the price from x1 to x2, firm 1 gains in terms of sale volume, since it sells
one unit for sure to type 2 consumer, while it lowers the margin on the
unit sold to type 1 consumer, which buys with equal probability from either
firm 1 or 2. Note that by lowering the price charged on the market, firm 1
does not steal the market of type 1 consumer to firm 2, since type 1 cannot
distinguish among prices inferior or equal to x1. Therefore, firm 1 has an
unilateral incentive deviate if π01 =
1
2
(x2 − c) + (x2 − c) > 12 (x1 − c), i.e.
when x2− c > 12 (x1 − x2). This condition requires that the profit margin on
one unit sold to type 2 consumer exceeds the loss (reduction of the margin)
in expected terms of selling to type 1 consumer. Note that firms have no
incentive to cut price below x2, since this would lead only to a reduction in
the margin per unit without increasing firm’s market share. Moreover, the
condition stated hold for both firms, given the symmetric cost structure.
Consider the opposite case: p1 = p2 = x2: both firms sell one unit to
both type 1 and 2 consumers with equal probability, receiveng an expected
profit equal to πi = x2−c, for i = 1, 2. The only possible deviation is to raise
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the price to x1. Suppose firm 1 deviates and charges x1: firm 1 will sell only
to type 1 consumer, since type 2 consumer can detect that firm 2 charges
a lower price. This happens with probability 1
2
, because type 1 consumers
cannot recognize prices below to the cutoﬀ point. Then firm 1’s profit after
deviation becomes π01 =
1
2
(x1 − c). Therefore, this deviation is optimal under
the condition 1
2
(x1 − c) ≥ x2 − c. This means that by increasing the profit
margin per unit sold, the deviating firm gets a gain higher than the loss due
the reduction in sales volume because he does not sell to type 2 consumers,
who can detect the firm charging the lowest price.
For intermediate values of the cutting point diﬀerential (x1 − x2), (x2 − c) <
x1 − x2 < 2 (x2 − c), two equilibria arise where firms coordinate to play the
opposite strategies in terms of prices. In this case, suppose firm 1 charges
x1 and firm 2 x2. Firm 1 sells only to type 1 consumers with 12 probability,
while firm 2 sells one unit of the good for sure to type 2 consumers and
to type 1 with probability 1
2
. Profits yielded by this price configuration are
π1 = 12 (x1 − c) and π2 =
3
2
(x2 − c) . There are two possible deviations: firm
1 can reduce the price charged to x2, getting profits equal to π01 = (x2 − c) or
firm 2 can increase the price to x1, getting profits equal to π02 =
1
2
(x1 − c).
The condition stated above is determined by imposing standard condition to
determine the non-optimality of unilateral deviation.
Contrary to standard Bertrand equilibrium configuration, note that when
c ≤ x2 < x1, it is not obvious that the equilibrium will occur at the lowest
cutting point p1 = p2 = x2 > c, because of the taughness of price competition
among firms. The above proposition shows that the equilibrium configuration
prevailing on the market depends on the marginal cost c and the cutting
point diﬀerential ∆x = x1 − x2.8. This result is driven by the the interplay
of two opposite incentives faced by each firm: on one hand, each firm wants
to undercut the rival in order to increase its market share, on the other
hand each firm has the incentive to charge the highest price within the price
partition, since each consumer cannot recognize prices below the cutting
point of the price partition.
The result is even more striking when we introduce heterogeneity in firms’
cost structure. Within the simple setting considered here, heterogeneity on
firms’ side can be introduced, by assuming firms diﬀer in their cost structure.
8Under the assumption there are N1 type 1 consumers and N2 type 2 consumers,
p1 = p2 = x2 is the equilibrium under the condition N2 (x2 − c) > 12N1 (x1 − x2), ie. total
net profit on selling to type 2 consumer is greater than the loss (in expected terms) of
reducing the margin to type 1 consumers.
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With no loss of generality, we assume c2 < c1. Two interesting cases may
arises, depending on the value of the cost parameters. Propositions 4 and 5
determine the equilibrium price configurations for diﬀerent parameter values.
Proposition 6 When c2 ≤ x2 < c1 ≤ x1, there is a unique equilibrium at
p1 = p2 = x1 if x2 − c2 < 12 (x1 − x2) or at p1 = x1and p2 = x2 otherwise.
Proof. Since x2 < c1 ≤ x1, firm 1 finds always optimal to fix p1 = x1, getting
π1 = 12 (x1 − c1)9. Firm 2 can either decide to fix p2 = x1, selling only to
type 1 consumers with a profit level of π2 = 12 (x1 − c1), since both firms
have equal probability to sell to type 1 consumers or set p2 = x2, getting
π2 = (x2 − c2) + 12 (x2 − c2). Two equilibrium configuration may arise at
p1 = p2 = x1 if x2− c2 < 12 (x1 − x2) and at p1 = x1 and p2 = x2 otherwise
Firm 2 has a clear cost advantage with respect to firm 1, since it is the only
firm who finds profitable to sell to both consumer types, since c2 ≤ x2 < x1.
Despite the presence of this cost advantage, firm 2 cannot exclude firm 1
from the market and moreover, it is not always clear that firm 2 will find
convenient to charge the lower price, at least to gain all the market of type
2 consumers. The predictions are even less sharp in case of a lower cost
advantage in favour of firm 2. Multiple equilibria arise according to diﬀerent
parameters assumptions.
Proposition 7 When c2 ≤ c1 ≤ x2 < x1, multiple equilibria arise.
Proof. When c2 ≤ c1 ≤ x2 < x1, firms 1 and 2 compete in prices and they
can find convenient to set either pi equal to x1 or x2, since both firms have
marginal cost lower than xi for i = 1, 2. The payoﬀs associated with this
game are represented by the following matrix:
x1 x2
x1 12 (x1 − c1) ;
1
2
(x1 − c1) 12 (x1 − c1) ; (x2 − c2) +
1
2
(x2 − c2)
x2 x2 − c1 + 12 (x2 − c1) ;
1
2
(x1 − c2) (x2 − c2) ; (x2 − c2)
Diﬀerent equilibria may arise depending on the value of the parameters
describing consumers’ partition of price space and firms’cost structure. The
following matrix gives the value of the parameter for which the 4 possible
outcomes may arise as Nash equilibria of the game that we have considered
above
9Since firm 1 has only 12 probability of getting the market of type 1 consumers under
p2 ≤ x1
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x1 x2
x1 x1 > x2 x1 < x1 < x2
x2 x2 < x1 < x1 x1 < x1
The payoﬀ matrix associated with game with heterogenous consumers
(with fixed exogenous partition) and heterogeneous firms is the following:
x1 x2
x1 12 (x1 − c1) ;
1
2
(x1 − c1) 12 (x1 − c1) ; (x2 − c2) +
1
2
(x2 − c2)
x2 x2 − c1 + 12 (x2 − c1) ;
1
2
(x1 − c2) (x2 − c2) ; (x2 − c2)
Diﬀerent equilibria may arise depending on the value of the parameters
describing consumers’ partition of price space and firms’cost structure.
x1 x2
x1 x1 > x2 x1 < x1 < x2
x2 x2 < x1 < x1 x1 < x1
p1 = p2 = x1. For firm 1, 12 (x1 − c1) > x2−c1+
1
2
(x2 − c1)⇒ x1 > 3x2−
2c1 ≡ x1. For firm 2, 12 (x1 − c2) > x2−c2+
1
2
(x2 − c2)⇒ x1 > 3x2−2c2 ≡ x2.
p1 = p2 = x2. For firm1, (x2 − c1) > 12 (x1 − c1) ⇒ x1 < 2x2 − c1 ≡ x1
For firm 2, (x2 − c2) > 12 (x1 − c2)⇒ x1 < 2x2 − c2 ≡ x2.
p1 = x1; p2 = x2. Given p2 = x2, for firm 1 (x2 − c1) < 12 (x1 − c1)⇒ x1 >
x1. Given p1 = x1, for firm 2, 12 (x1 − c2) < x2 − c2 +
1
2
(x2 − c2)⇒ x1 < x2
p1 = x2; p2 = x1. Given p2 = x1, for firm 1 12 (x1 − c1) < x2 − c1 +
1
2
(x2 − c1) ⇒ x1 < x1. Given p1 = x2, for firm 2, 12 (x1 − c2) > x2 − c2 ⇒
x1 < x2
The ordering of the cutoﬀ points is the following: x2 > x1. Moreover
x2 > x2 and x1 > x1.. Therefore, x2 > x1 > x1. Need to distinguish two
cases: when x2 > x1, in which case there arise multiple equilibria (both
p1 = x1, p2 = x2 or p1 = x2, p2 = x1 may arise) or when x2 < x1, in which
case p1 = x2, p2 = x1 is ruled out as an equilibrium.
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